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Abstract:  The  paradox  of  modern  constitutionalism  resides  in  having  two  imperatives, 
apparently  irreconcilable,  i.e.  a  governmental  power  generated  from  the  ‘consent  of  the 





Islamic  legal  culture.  While  modern  constitutionalism,  as  a  normative  order,  requires  the 
adherence to the rule of law and the protection of human rights, it is in the name of national, 

























by  the  constitution  itself.  If  one  admits  that  the  constituent  power  refers  to  a  pre‐existing 
collective,  i.e.  a  ‘We’  that  are  able,  as  a  collective  who  is  aware  of  being  so,  to  will  and  to 
express  that  will  in  a  comprehensive  and  distinctive  way,  then  one  cannot  deny  the  simple 
conclusion which  implies  that a constituent power entails a  representative claiming  to  talk  in 
the name of that ‘We’.1 This is the paradox of constitutionalism, to which some scholars refer.2  
∗ Asem Khalil, Research Fellow, 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NYU School 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Assistant 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Public 




1  See H.  Lindahl,  Constituent  Power  and  Reflexive  Identity:  Towards  an  Ontology  of  Collective  Selfhood,  in  THE 
PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 9, 9‐26 (M. Loughlin and N. Walker eds., Oxford, Oxford University Press 2007). 
2  In  a  recent  book, M.  Loughlin  and  N. Walker  argued  that:  “Modern  constitutionalism  is  underpinned  by  two 
fundamental though antagonistic imperatives: that governmental power ultimately is generated from the ‘consent 
of  the people’  and  that,  to be  sustained and effective,  such power must be divided,  constrained,  and exercised 
through  distinctive  institutional  forms.  The  people,  in  Maistre’s  words,  ‘are  a  sovereign  that  cannot  exercise 
sovereignty’; the power they possess, it would appear, can only be exercised through constitutional forms already 
established or in the process of being established. This indicated what, in its most elementary formulation, might 
be  called  the  paradox  of  constitutionalism.”  M.  Loughlin  and  N.  Walker,  Introduction,  in  THE  PARADOX  OF 









but  rather  to  describe  its  possible  accommodation with  other  concepts  such  as  sovereignty  and/or  democracy: 





distinctive  institutional  forms.3  This  paradox  reflects  the  dilemma  that  arises  from  the 
dialectical  interaction  between  constituent  power  and  constitutional  form,  between 
democracy, as the rule of  the people, and the rule of  law. The only way out seems to be the 






necessary, almost  inevitable, fiction;  largely because it  is  impossible to know what the people 
want – admitting at the first place that the people can ever have one unique will5 – but most 
importantly, because even those who pretend to know what the people want and pretend to 
have  the  authority  to  express  that  will,  are  –  if  they  want  to  be  coherent  with  what  they 







(in which case Arab or Muslim  state  is presented as special, unique,  to be distinguished from 





as  providing  the  rules  and  institutional  mechanisms  necessary  to  give  expression  to  that  will.”  R.  Bellamy, 





5  It  is  true  that  the  people  are  assimilated  with  a  subject,  but  the  people  are  never  an  ‘I’  but  always  a  ‘We’. 
Accordingly,  the  people,  by  definition  is  always  plural,  and  its  will  is  by  definition  multiple.  The  fiction  is  in 
pretending that the ‘We’ had spoken as an ‘I’ and that the democracy – perceived as the rule of the majority – as 
much as the rule of law are the tools that make this possible. 





In  this  paper,  I  will  suggest  considering  constitutionalism  as  an  opportunity,  rather  than  a 
paradox,  for  contemporary Arab  states  in need  for  justifying  their  authority,  their  legitimacy, 
and their same existence as states. I will first assess how ‘popular sovereignty’ is central in most 
constitutions of Arab states (Section II). Despite the democratic deficiency present in most Arab 
states,  this  reference  is  relevant  in  that  it  is  connected  to  an  identity,  which  needs  to  be 
justified  by  reference  to  the  state‐produced  constitution  and  law  (Section  III).  This  people 
(demos) compete with other narratives, including Arab nationalism, and Islamism. For both, the 
state  is  a  too  narrow  to  include  the  Arab  nation  or  the  Islamic  umma  (Section  IV).  While 
territorial nationalism seems to prevail, the issue of pre‐established identity, and the impact it 
has on the state is remarkable, and need to be duly considered (Section V). In such a context, 
the  constitution, more  than  a  binding  law  limiting  the  government,  is  only  one  of  the many 
ways  the  existing  regimes  talk  to  different  constituencies,  whether  local,  regional,  or 
international,  searching  for  legitimacy  (Section  VI).  A  different  ways  of  looking  at  Shari‘a  in 
constitutional  text  is  also discussed,  i.e.  a  reading  that  sees  in  this  the development of what 
some  called  Islamic  constitutionalism  (Section  VII).  Finally,  I  will  suggest  relocating  the 
discussion  regarding  modern  constitutionalism,  to  connect  it  with  the  development  of  both 




Arab  states  may  refer  to  remote  historical,  cultural,  social  and  political  experiences. 
Nevertheless,  in  their  current  territorial  forms,  they  are  a  very  recent  product. Whether  this 
was a colonial product,6 or a genuine development,7 a reaction against anarchism,8 or victory 
                                                




7  Iliya  Harik,  for  example,  traces  the  origin  of  various  Arab  states,  and  identifies  their  structure,  power  base, 
legitimacy, and  traditions by proposing  five different  types of  state:  (1)  the  imam‐chief  system as  in  the case of 











facilitated  by  the  absence  of  alternatives,9  contemporary  Arab  states  are  indeed  largely 
artificially shaped.10  In such a context, the state, each state, needs to make a choice between 
many normative orders that compete. In this paper I will argue that constitutionalism is one of 





The  ‘Constitution’,  identified  since  the  eighteenth  century with  a  single  document  governing 
the  government,  has  its  roots  in  two  historical  experiences,  the  American  and  French 
                                                                                                                                                       
London, Croom Helm Ltd 1987). Such historical data suggest that only limited number of Arab states (particularly 
the Fertile Crescent) are the direct creation of colonialism, and the British and French antagonism in the Middle 
East,  as  argued  by  Burhan  Ghalioun  for  example:  "[Q]uant  au  Croissant  Fertile,  il  est  partagé  entre  des  Etats 
artificiels  distribués  en  zones  d’influences  aux  colonialismes  antagonistes  anglais  et  français."  B.  GHALIOUN,  LE 
MALAISE ARABE ‐ L'ETAT CONTRE LA NATION 24 (Paris, La Découverte 1991). Admitting that the above thesis related to 
the origin of territorial Arab states is correct, it is nonetheless undeniable that colonialism and foreign interference 
largely  influenced  the  boundaries  of  territorial  Arab  states  and  gave  them  the  shape  they  have  right  now.  Iliya 












territorial  state  are  closely  related  to  its  foreign origin,  does  this  foreign origin provide  sufficient  and necessary 
reasons also to explain its continuing consolidation and supremacy?” Id. at 73.  
8 Accordingly, territorial states are simply a reaction against archaism and a kind of adaptation to new world order. 
As  pointed  out  by  Ghalioun,  the  Arab  state  is  not  the  embodiment  of  the  oriental  or  Islamist  state,  but  is  the 
reaction or  fear of  archaism  in  the Arab world. Arabs  in  fact  felt  the necessity  to  adapt  themselves  to  the new 
world order. See Ghalioun, supra note 7, at 53‐66. 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Revolutions.11 Based on those historical roots,12  the diffusion of written constitutions and the 
ideas  that  supported  it,13  since  then,  is  remarkable.14  A  ‘written  constitution’,  deemed  old‐
fashioned  for  old  democracies,15  is  increasingly  considered  the  best  way  for  new  nations  to 
‘write down’  their constitutional commitments and compromises.16 However,  the “worldwide 
embrace of written constitution”17 can be explained partially by being a legitimating tool for the 











the  time:  the  same  should  apply  to  constitutional  law;  2)  The  people  of  the  eighteenth  century  Revolution 
considered a new constitution, edited by national sovereignty, as a true renewal of the social contract: as such, it 
was necessary to register the clauses of that contract in the most solemn and complete form; 3) They thought that 
a  clear,  systematic  presentation  of  such  a  document  in  a  clear  and  systematic way would  provide  an  excellent 
means of political education, since it would provide the citizens with the knowledge and desire for their rights. See 
A ESMEIN, ELEMENTS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL FRANÇAIS ET COMPARE 603‐4 (1927). 
14 Arjomand distinguishes  five  stage s  in world constitutional history, each with  its  typical mode of  constitution‐
making: 1) The medieval  and pre‐modern era down  to  the eighteenth  century. 2) The modern  stage of political 
reconstruction rational design  in  the age of democratic  revolutions  in  the  late eighteenth century. 3) The age of 














problem  for  a  country  that  imagines  itself  living  under  a  written  Constitution.”  Bruce  Ackerman,  The  Living 
Constitution 120 HARV. L. REV 1737, 1741 (2007).  










world.21  They  share  the  overwhelming  interest  in  written  and  rigid  constitutions  (although 
                                                
18  For  Sathyamurthy,  a written  constitution  serves  as  an  instrument  of  political  cohesion  in  Postcolonial  states: 
“Constitutions  were  expected  to  fulfill  a  dual  role,  enabling  a  smooth  and  orderly  transition  from  anticolonial 
struggle  to  independent  self‐rule,  and  at  the  same  time  securing  for  the  new  regime  the  political  fruits  of 
nationhood, new state structures, legitimacy (domestic and international), and sovereignty[.]” T. V. Sathyamurthy, 
The  Constitution  as  an  Instrument  of  Political  Cohesion  in  Postcolonial  States:  The  Case  of  India,  1950‐1993,  in 
DESIGNS  FOR DEMOCRATIC STABILITY: STUDIES  IN VIABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM 147, 147  (A.  I. Baaklini and H. Desfosses eds., 
Armonk, New York, London, M.E. Sharpe 1997). Based on empirical comparative study between constitutions of 












of  the  spirit  of  constitutionalism generally  goes hand  in hand with  the  implementation of written  constitution.” 





and  international  crisis.  In  the  first  half  of  the  20th  century,  newly  independent  Arab  states  issued  written 




Constitutional  Moment?”  He  argues  indeed  that,  “Arab  states  have  come  under  a  variety  of  domestic  and 
international  pressures;  and  constitutional  design  and  redesign  have  provided  them  some  tools  for  crafting 
constitutional responses. The global resurgence of liberalism; the desire to allow for sharply controlled democratic 
openings;  the  need  to  parry  opposition  as  regimes  jettison welfare  commitments  and  confront  fiscal  crisis  the 
exigencies  of  political  succession;  and  (in  dramatic  case)  foreign  invasion  have  inspired  some  constitutional 
experimentation.”  Id.  at  56.  Interestingly,  the  Constitution  of  Egypt  of  1971  stated  in  Article  1  that  the  Arab 
Republic of Egypt is a state which system is “democratic and socialist”. In 1980 amendment, the order switched to 
“socialist  and  democratic”.  In  the  2007  amendment,  it  simply  disappeared  from  the  text.  For  more,  see  the 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often  as  camouflage22  and  façade23  constitutions).  They  also  follow  the  global  trend  towards 
constitutional  structures,  and  constitutionalism  in  general.24  In  the  1990s,  a  new  era  of 
‘transition  to  democracy’  took  place,  especially  in  the  post‐Communist  countries  Eastern 
Europe  and  Russia.25  Arab  states  did  not miss  this  new  era  of  constitutionalism; many  Arab 
constitutions, indeed, were re‐written, amended, or even adopted for the first time.26  
                                                                                                                                                       
collection  of  Egyptian  constitutions,  compiled  by  the  Shura  Council  of  Egypt  (p.419,  n.  1),  available  online  (in 
Arabic) at: http://www.shoura.gov.eg/const_pdf/constitution_main.pdf  
22 This occurs in case of states that have formally drafted constitutional documents without for that reason being 
actually  employed  in  the  real  life  operations  of  the  State.  The  written  constitution  is  simply  not  being 
implemented. See LANE, supra note 20, at 134‐5.  
23  “Façade  constitution”  refers  to  the  situation  that  occurs  when  a  government  is  established  without  being 
accepted by the people. Constitutions,  in contrast, are premised on the acceptance of state power as legitimate. 




1632  (2008).  It  is  true  that  such  constitutions  may  not  serve  as  regulatory  law,  instruments  of  a  limited 
government, or ground rules rather they serve as  ‘program constitutions’. As pointed out by Frankenberg  liberal 
constitutionalism  often  dismiss  such  façade  constitutions  (making  reference  to  the  ‘socialist  constitutions’).  For 
him  this  is  something  deplorable,  because  dismissing  those  constitutions  means  missing  the  stories  program 
constitutions  can  tell  us.  Günter  Frankenberg,  Comparing  constitutions:  Ideas,  ideals,  and  ideology—toward  a 
layered narrative, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 439, 453 (2006). Similar argument can be advanced to Arab constitutions. They 
may not correspond to  liberal constitutionalism but they still have something to tell.  In such a context, having a 
written  constitution  may  serve  the  objective  of  creating  a  façade  constitution,  setting  out  a  program  not  a 
regulatory tool. As pointed out by Nathan Brown, it is the existing regimes in the Arab world that had composed 
the  constitutions not  the other way  around.  In  this  sense,  constitutions were designed  to  enable  these existing 
regimes, whether  through  fiscal  reform,  establishing  sovereignty,  or  proclaiming  new  ideological  directions.  See 
Brown, supra note 21, at 55. For him: “most constitutional documents [in the Arab World] have been promulgated 
less  by  the  nation  assembled  than  by  existing  regimes  seeking  tools  to  enable  them  to  face  domestic  and 
international challenges.” Id. at 48.  






INT.L  J.  CONST.  L.  93,  96  (2007))  that  resulted  from  the  ‘post‐Communist  constitutional  reconstruction’  (See 
Arjomand, supra note 14). A period  that  some called  ‘transition  to democracy’  (See W. Osiatynski, Paradoxes of 
Constitutional Borrowing 2 INT.L J. CONST. L. 244, 249 (2003)),  ‘transition from post‐authoritarian regimes’ (See M. 
Loughlin, Constitutional Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay, 25 OJLS 183, 189 (2005)), ‘transition from one‐party rule 


























former  constitutional  structures  (mainly  constitutional  courts and parliament) have begun  to  revive allowing  for 
some  constitutional  openings.  This  is  the  case  of  Egyptian  Supreme  Constitutional  Court,  or  the  parliamentary 
experience of Jordan, Palestine and Kuweit. Fourth, a special case of constitution making in Iraq occurred after the 
American invasion. This process is directly related to this forced change in the regime. See id. at 56‐66.  
27  In  the  Arab world,  constitutions may  describe  a  variety  of  political  structures:  federal,  as  in  the United  Arab 
Emirates and the Sudan; unitary, as in Tunisia; a constitutional monarchy, as in Jordan; a republic, as in Egypt; or a 
traditional  hereditary monarchy,  as  in  Saudi Arabia. While most Arab  constitutions  are documents with  roughly 
similar provisions, some constitutions are noteworthy products of historical and political circumstances.  In Saudi 




while  in  some  countries,  the  head  of  the  state may  issue  amendments  by  decree.  However, most  Arab  states 
adapted written and rigid constitutions. In previous study I indentified some of those characteristics: 1) Many Arab 
states  adapted  constitutions  after  independence  (Algiers  gained  independence  on  5  July  1962,  and  adopted  its 
Constitution  on  10  September  1963  (suspended  in  1965;  the  second  Constitution  was  adopted  in  1976  and 
amended  in  1979,  1988,  1989,  1996);  Bahrain  gained  independence  on  15  August  1971,  and  adopted  its 
Constitution on 6 December 1973 (suspended  in 1975 and adopted the National Charter  in 2001 after a popular 
referendum);  the  United  Arab  Emirates  gained  independence  on  2  December  1971  and  adopted  a  provisional 
constitution on the same date (that became permanent in 1996); Kuwait gained independence on 19 July 1961 and 
adopted its constitution a year later; Mauritania adopted its constitution immediately after independence in 1961). 




within  the  Ottoman  Empire,  and  began  very  early  on,  the  codification  process.  Egypt  was  also  familiar  with 
different constitutions. 5) Some systems are related to special circumstances such as Saudi Arabia, which has no 
constitution but the Shari‘a; and Libya which has a Constitutional Proclamation – The Green Book and a popular 




The  principle  of  popular  sovereignty,29  or  national  sovereignty,30  is  included  in  most  Arab 
constitutions  that  adopted written  constitutions. While  referring  often  to  the  people  (or  the 
nation),31 as the holder of constituent power,32 the source of all powers,33 it is often stated that 
the  people  exercise  it  through  its  representatives,34  or  through  referendum,35  through  the 
                                                                                                                                                       
Proclamation.  6)  There  are  Unitarian  States  such  as  Tunisia,  and  Federal  States  such  as  Sudan.  7)  There  are 
different political systems such as constitutional royal hereditary (Jordan) and republican (Egypt). See ASEM KHALIL, 
THE  ENACTMENT OF  CONSTITUENT  POWER  IN  THE ARAB WORLD:  THE  PALESTINIAN  CASE  157‐9  (PIFF  Etudes  et  Colloques  47, 
Fribourg,  Helbing &  Lichtenhahn,  2006).  For more  about  constitutions  in  Arab  countries,  see:  E.  CANAL‐FORGUES, 
‘RECUEIL DES CONSTITUTIONS DES PAYS ARABES’ (Bruxelles, Bruylant 2000). Other data are available at the website of the 
Program of Governance in the Arab Region (POGAR): http://www.pogar.org/. Nathan Brown has produced many 
scholarship  of  great  relevance  regarding  Arab  States  constitutions.  See  Brown,  supra  note  21;  Nathan  Brown, 
Constituting Palestine: The Effort of Writing a Basic Law for the Palestinian Authority 54 MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL 25, 25‐
43 (2000); NATHAN BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD (Albany, State University of New York Press 
2002); NATHAN BROWN, PALESTINIAN  POLITICS  AFTER  THE OSLO ACCORDS:  RESUMING ARAB PALESTINE  (Berkeley, University of 
California Press 2003). 
28 It is with this detail in mind that readers need to mitigate any seemingly generalizing conclusions I reach in the 






the  Kingdom of  Bahrain  (February  14th,  2002);  the  Preamble  (d)  of  the Constitution of  Lebanon  (1926, with  all 
amendments); Article 1 of the Transitional Federal Charter of Somalia (2004); Article 2 of the Constitution of Sudan 
(2005); Article 2 of the Constitution of Syria (1973). For more about Arab Constitutions referred to in this and the 








Lebanon; Article  2  of  the Basic  Law of  the  Palestinian Authority;  Article  59  of  the  Constitution  of Qatar  (2004); 
Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Yemen (1994).  






constitutional  institutions,36 or  in the way prescribed by the constitution.37  In some instances, 
the supremacy or sovereignty of the law,38 or the constitution,39 is stated expressly.40  
One may  challenge  the  relevance  of  such  constitutional  provisions  for  two  reasons  at  least. 
First,  despite  the  similarities  in  constitutional provisions,  there  is  a  gap  in  the Arab  countries 
between the law of the constitution (as a written text) and the ‘real constitution’. Second, such 
constitutional provisions do not mean much in the absence of a democratic system, based on 
the  rule  of  law.41  Both  objections  insinuate  that,  in  order  to  know  more  about  the  real 





not  arguments  that  can  be  raised  against  Arab  Constitutions  alone.  Such  phenomena  are 
indeed  present  in  other  parts  of  the world.  Historically  speaking,  “popular  sovereignty”  was 





                                                
36  See,  e.g.,  Article  5  of  the  Constitution  of  Iraq;  Preamble  (d)  of  the  Constitution  of  Lebanon;  Article  2  of  the 
Constitution of Morocco; Article 2 of the Basic Law of the Palestinian Authority. 










as  much  as  the  rule  through  law  (i.e.  the  ruler’s  employment  of  the  form  of  the  law  for  his  or  her  acts  of 
domination).  Those  are  arguably  the  twofold meanings  of  the  rule  of  law.  UK  Preuss,  R.  Bellamy,  The  political 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states,  is  not  God  nor  the  Holy  Book  of  any  particular  religion,  but  rather  lies  in  a  humanly 
established community, territorially defined, the reflection of the needs of its time, contingent 
to immanent needs and will.  
The  fact  that most Arab  states,  although  largely undemocratic,  adopt  rigid  constitutions,  and 
refer  to  the  people  as  source  of  authority,  proves  the  importance  this  principle  for  the 
legitimacy  of  Arab  states,  in  a  way  similar  to  other  countries  all  over  the  world.  Most 
importantly,  it  is  of  particular  relevance  for  the  territorially  defined  Arab  states,  on  the  one 
hand,  to  distinguish  themselves  from  neighboring  Arab  states  and  peoples,  although  sharing 
the  same  belonging  to  the  Arab  nation,  and  on  the  other,  to  accommodate  religious  and 
sectarian diversities within  its  borders. Accordingly,  despite being  absented and marginalized 
from the real affairs of the state, the reference to the ‘people’ in constitutional texts is relevant 
for contemporary Arab states. It means that authority is exercised by human beings, on human 





Popular  sovereignty  as  a  theoretical  principle  may  be  embodied  in  most  constitutions,  but 
sovereignty  of  the  people,  even  in  democracies,  is  only  a  slogan without  real  content.45  It  is 
being under  the  same  law and  institutions  that makes of  them one people as  ‘demos’.46 The 
people  are  not  free  to  exercise  direct  power,  but  only  through  their  representative 
government. They may have a role to play in certain circumstances, but only if the constitution 
permits that. Accordingly, the constitution, enacted by the constituent power, the prerogative 
of  the  sovereign,  frame  the way  the  people,  the  governed,  participate  in  deciding  their  own 
destiny.47  




established.  This  indicated  what,  in  its  most  elementary  formulation,  might  be  called  the  paradox  of 
constitutionalism.” Loughlin and Walker, supra note 2, at 1. 
46 For Sieyès, for example, the nation is a “body of associates  living under common laws and represented by the 
same  legislative  assembly.”  Cited  in:  Ulrich  K.  Preuss,  Constitutional  Powermaking  of  the  New  Polity:  Some 
deliberations  between  the  Constituent  Power  and  the  Constitution,  in  CONSTITUTIONALISM,  IDENTITY,  DIFFERENCE,  AND 
LEGITIMACY:  THEORETICAL  PERSPECTIVES  143,  149  (Michel  Rosenfeld  ed.,  Durham  and  London,  Duke  University  Press 
1994).  
47 Even in the case of France, the ‘general will’, still influential and central in French constitutional tradition, is not 




If  it  is not the people, then, who is the sovereign, whose will  is embodied in the constitution? 
What  are  the  criteria  to  know  which  forms  of  government  fit  the  needs  of  pre‐established 
community,  in  order  to  accommodate  the  sovereign  power  in  the  state? Many  answers  are 
theoretically  possible;  my  suggestion  is  to  consider  the  particular  place  the  ‘state’  had  in 
modern  societies.  In  the  19th  century,  indeed,  attributing  sovereignty  to  the  state  resolved  a 
struggle  between  those  favoring  the  sovereignty  of  the monarch  and  those  favoring  popular 
sovereignty.  State  sovereignty,  as  a  compromise  between both  doctrines,  gave  the  state  the 
central place it occupied, which lead to the denomination of Staatsrecht (the law of the state), 
instead of Verfassungsrecht (constitutional law).48  
It  is  the  state,  acquiring  a  personality,  which  is  the  new  sovereign.  This  State‐Sovereign  is 
omnipresent and absolute in that it is no more one of the many forms political communities can 
be shaped. It is The Form, almost the only one, central in both domestic and international law. 
It  is  this  State‐Sovereign  that  characterizes  and  distinguishes modern  Arab  states.49  It  is  the 
state that is at the center of attention; its security, stability, and protection have priority over 
whatever  other  objectives  in  the  legal  and  political  system.  The  state  here  is  priceless  and 
everything  else  can  be  sacrificed.  Although  recognized  as  citizens,  those  are  no  more  than 
subjects  on  which  the  state  exercise  its  authority,  indiscreetly.  It  does  not  serve  other 
objectives,  but  the  preservation  of  itself  is  the  objective.  It  is  absolute  and  knows  no  limits 
whatsoever.  
Such a state sees in the similarly evolving neighboring Arab states as a potential danger.50 The 
result  of  this  evolution  is  that  Arab  states  are  becoming  increasingly  entrenched  and 
naturalized.51 The oil phenomenon with the disparities in richness between Arab states serves 
                                                                                                                                                       
contemporary France, “the shaping of the general will depends on the executive and on the Constitutional Council 
as  well  as  on  the  legislature”  (Rosenfeld,  supra  note  20,  at  13)  (making  reference  to  the  contribution  of:  D. 
Rousseau’s contribution to the volume he edited).  
48 See A. V. Bogdandy, The past and promise of doctrinal constructivism: A strategy for responding to the challenges 
facing  constitutional  scholarship  in  Europe,  7  INT.L  J.  CONST.  L.  364,  385  (2009).  For  this  reason  constitutional 





dans  ce  domaine…  n’ont  jamais  été  systématiques  dans  le  Monde  Arabe.  Et  même  si  le  débat  sur  la  nation 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this  purpose.52  Many  newly  established  countries  in  the  region  (such  as  Kuwait  and  Qatar) 
retain the word ‘State’ in their official name, as if their statehood was too vulnerable not to be 
systematically  reasserted.  It also explains  the Palestinians’ emotional  investment  in a state of 
their own, and the Palestinian Authority insistence on symbols of the state (a flag, a passport, a 




movements  that  go  beyond  the  rhetoric  of  Arab  unity  based  on  the  existing  sovereign  Arab 
states.54 Without  undermining  other  possible  reasons  (historical,  political,  or  legal),  it  is  the 
attachment  to  territorially  defined  states  that  explains  best  why  most  Arab  states  did  not 
recognize Iraqi annexation of Kuwait, and supported coalition (with other non‐Muslim and non‐
Arab  countries)  against  Iraq,  member  of  the  Arab  League,  during  the  first  Gulf  War.  This 
explains  also  why  Arab  states  are  reticent  towards  permitting  double  Arab  nationalities, 
effectively banned in the Arab States55 (thus, reject the possibility of double Arab loyalties).  
The  paradox  in  the  Arab  world  is  the  attachment  to  territorial  states,  related  to  ‘popular 
sovereignty’ of each Arab people,  i.e.  territorially defined; at  the  same  time other discourses 
are  used  to  legitimate  state  authority,  including  the  reference  to  Arab  nation  and  Islamic 
umma.56 The gap between the discourse and the reality  is clear.  It  is sometimes explained by 
the dichotomy between  indigenous political culture and the  imported elitist culture.57  I argue 
                                                                                                                                                       
foreign  import.  It  is  thus  a  hybrid  product.  Though  its  form  represented  the  primacy  and  globalisation  of  the 








Arab  League.  It  is  the  principle  of  non‐interference  in  other  states’  internal  affairs  and  the  respect  of  their 
sovereignty,  institutionalized  in  Article  8  of  the  Charter which  characterizes  the  Arab  League  and maybe which 
permitted its establishment after all, and the adherence of all Arab countries.  
55  See  BADIL,  SURVEY  OF  PALESTINIAN  REFUGEES  AND  INTERNALLY  DISPLACED  PERSONS  2006‐2007  126  (Bethlehem,  Badil 
Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights 2007). 
56 See text accompanying notes 57‐61.  








the  same  time  defending  its  territorially‐defined  sovereignty.  It  is  a  dichotomy  between  a 
people, historically, culturally and largely religiously defined, and a people of a particular state, 
legally established. At  least per  regions  (for example,  the Fertile Crescent, Arabian Peninsula, 





Nationalism may have rapidly  invaded Arab mentality, as much as  in many other parts of  the 
world,  giving  rise  to  territorially defined modern  states. However,  this  invasion has not been 
met with a clear definition of what exactly the nation is.58 The relation between Arab ‘nation’ 
and single Arab  ‘people’ may not be well  comprehended using concepts  such as  ‘nation’ and 
‘people’.59 In fact, these two concepts have to be understood in the light of the wider concept 
of  the  umma,60  which  is  often  used  to  refer  to  Islamic  community  or  the  community  of 
                                                
58 See Salamé, supra note 7, at 4.  
59 There is not one unique definition for the concept of nation, people and state. Actually, these terms are often 
used  as  synonymous, while  they  are  not.  As  an  example  of  that  confusion, we will mention  the  charter  of  the 
United  Nations.  In  fact,  we  read  in  its  first  beginning:  “we  the  peoples  of  the  United  Nations…”  while  the 
organization membership is limited to states. Peoples subjectivity, in fact is limited to the recognition of people’s 
right  to  self‐determination,  which  is  not  interpreted  pacifically,  especially  when  it  does  mean  the  right  to 
statehood, since the United Nations is based on sovereignty of member states. Similar confusion occurs with the 
Arabic  terminology.  The  concept  umma  (translated  as  a  nation)  is  used  when  it  refers  to  Islamic  and/or  Arab 
nation, while sha’b (translated as people) refers to single Arab peoples and dawla (translated as state) refers to the 




‘nation’  (translated  as  ‘national’)  is  qawmiyya  when  it  refers  to  the  Arab  nation,  while  it  is  wataniyya  (also 
translated as  ‘national’) when it  is related to the territorial Arab nationalism, also meaning patriotism. While the 
concept  of muwatana  refers  to  the  citizenship;  this  concept  has  its  origin  in watan  that  is  homeland,  although 
sometimes it is used to refer to Arab land, alwatan al‐arabi! For more, see Khalil, supra note 27, at 86‐7. 
60 In his book, Az‐Zahir fi ma’ani Kalimat an‐Nas, Ibn al‐Anbari notes that the term umma (nation) occurs in eight 
different  senses  in  Arabic.  Some  of  these meanings  are:  a  community  or  a  group  of  people;  a  religion;  time… 
Besides,  the  terms  nation  (umma)  and  mother  (umm)  prove  by  virtue  of  their  being  derived  from  the  same 
linguistic root, that ‘nation’ is an extension of one’s family – indeed it is the bond of brotherhood par excellence. ‘A 
nation  is  a  uterine  experience’,  says  al‐Arsuzi,  meaning  that  it  is  an  extension  of  foetal  life.  In  the  al‐muheit 
dictionary the term umma means a group of people (nas) united by common land,  language, tradition,  interests, 
emotions and aspirations; Accordingly, the Arabs would be considered as one complete umma although they may 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believers  (al‐umma al‐Islameyya) or  to Arab nation  (al‐umma al‐‘arabeyya). However,  there  is 
no  contemporary  state  that  can  pretend  to  incorporate  one  or  both  nations  in  one  political 
community. What we have right now is a multiplicity of territorially defined states.  
For Arab nationalists,  the  (Arab) nation exists as a human group with  its own characteristics, 
such  as  language,  history  and  traditions.61  This  means  that  the  reference  to  Arab  nation  as 
cultural  heritage  does  not  exclude  necessarily  the  support  for  political  unity,62  but  it  is  not 
necessarily exhausted or limited to it. What is clear is that all attempts to (political) unity failed, 
and  Arab  nationalism  started  to  adapt  and  accommodate  its  ideology with  the  current  Arab 
territorial states.  
If  one  admits  that  a  culturally‐defined  (or  even  ethnically‐shaped)  nation,  the  Arab  nation, 
helped  in  the  first  instance  to  justify  the  revolution  of  the  Arabs,  or  parts  of  the  Arab 
populations,  against  other  Muslims,  the  Ottomans,63  how  can  we  distinguish  between  Arab 
populations,  and  the  currently  established  territorial  Arab  states. What makes  the  Jordanian 
different from the Palestinian, the Lebanese from the Syrian? As a consequence, adopting the 
concept  of  nation  as  in  demos  is  virtually  indispensable.  A  nation  is  no  more  culturally  or 




religion,  their  skin  color,  their  language.  They  share  a  common  history,  experiences,  and 
tragedies. They have the same origin and homeland. They may feel, accordingly, affinities with 
                                                                                                                                                       
be distributed in different states, each holding its own political independence. In the al‐Ghany dictionary the term 
umma means a group of people  (nas) united by common historical  liaisons  that may be composed of  language, 
religion  or  the  economy  and  have  the  same  goals  in  their  beliefs,  the  politics  or  in  the  economy.  It  is  used  to 
indicate the Arabic umma and the Islamic umma. The same term is used in plural umam to indicate, for example 









rulers.  They  identified  with  the  Ottomans  and  looked  upon  the  Sultan  as  the  Muslim  head  of  a  Muslim 
commonwealth of which they were a part. See Harik, supra note 7, at 35. For Bensaid it was the strong notion of 





certain groups rather than with others. This  is what  I  refer to as  ‘cultural heritage’;  it has the 
advantage of creating bounds that unite individuals, regardless – and sometimes despite – the 
state  itself.  In this sense,  individuals, although they may be sometimes stateless,64 are always 
within a community, never as individuals alone.  
As  human  beings,  nations  also  have  their  history.  Individuals  are  born  and  integrated within 
that community, often without their own choice. A state may exist one day and may disappear 
the  next.  Once  created,  however,  the  state  is  never  the  product  of  nothing,  because 
“nothingness” simply does not exist.  It  is always a state of a particular people who may have 
their  own  history,  language  and  culture.65 Most  importantly,  it  is  precisely  this  identity  that 
explains, justifies and pushes towards the independence, for those countries which were under 







                                                
64 This is the case right now of most Palestinians. In fact, half of the global Palestinian populations are stateless. R. 
Hammami  and  P.  Johnson,  Equality  with  a  Difference:  Gender  and  Citizenship  in  Transitional  Palestine,  SOCIAL 
POLITICS  314,  316  (1999).  According  to  Shiblak,  Palestinians,  in  fact,  are  the  largest  stateless  community  in  the 
world. The Palestinians of West Bank and Gaza Strip are de facto stateless since 1967, following Israeli occupation. 
A. Shiblak, Stateless Palestinians 26 FORCED MIGRATION REVIEW 8‐9 (2006). The creation of the Palestinian Authority 
(which  is  not  a  sovereign  state)  and  the  grant  of  a  Travel  Document  did  not  change  this  reality.  SEE  A.  KHALIL, 
PALESTINIAN  NATIONALITY  AND  CITIZENSHIP:  CURRENT  CHALLENGES  AND  FUTURE  PERSPECTIVES  27‐8,  34‐5  (Research  Report 













shape  it and which  it  in  turn helps  to shape.” MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE  IN WESTERN LAW 8 (1987), 
quoted in: Tushnet, supra, at 1269. For Tushnet (supra, at 1269‐1285), those are examples of what can be called 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general.  It  has,  most  importantly,  serious  consequences  on  the  way  ‘constituent  power’  is 
perceived, exercised and expressed. Here, two new questions arise. First, can a constitution be 
regarded as  legitimate only  if  it reflects a pre‐constitutional shared  identity (cultural heritage, 
or culture) or is the making of the constitution tantamount to the construction of ‘the people’? 
The  answer  to  this  question  appears  simple,  since  both  cases  are  theoretically  possible.  In 
practice  it  will  depend  of  the  concerned  country  and  the  particular  context  in  which  the 
constitution is enacted.70  
                                                                                                                                                       
‘expressivism’. “For the expressivist, constitutions emerge out of each nation's distinctive history and express  its 










sovereign,  the  constitution  and  the  constitutional  form.  A  constitution,  limiting  branches  of  government,  is 
intrinsically connected to the sovereign. A constitution does not necessarily limit the sovereign, because this does 
not make sense (at least in terms of legality‐illegality); rather it enables his absence from day to day politics. The 
constitutional  from  enables  branches  of  government  to  exercise  their  power  with  authority,  because  they  are 
shaped and framed by the constitution, connected to the sovereign. 
69 I refer to demos and ethnos in this paper in the same way used by Töpperwien: Demos (staatsvolk) refers to the 
totality  of  citizens while  ethnos  (Volk)  is  a  community  based  on  the  belief  in  a  common  descent  or  culture.  N. 
TÖPPERWIEN, NATION‐STATE AND NORMATIVE DIVERSITY 4‐5 (Bâle, Genève, Munich, Helbing & Lichtenhahn 2001). Preuss 
distinguishes  between  two  different  conceptions  of  the  nation,  the  French  and  the  German  (which  is  also  the 




70  In  the  United  States,  the  ‘nation’  and  the  ‘culture’  are  not  linked  at  all;  culture  is  not  relevant  for  the  state 









the  group with  a  pre‐established  identity,  the  people  (as ethnos), which  is  prior  to  the  state 
itself. To answer  the second question, different options may be considered: First,  there  is no 
connection  at  all  between  the  two.71  This  is  the  position  of  Hans  Kelsen;72  with  his  legal 
positivism,  he  resolves  the  paradox  of  what  can  be  termed  the  question  of  ‘constitutional 
legitimacy’ (i.e. legitimately adopted constitutions) by separating the legal from the political.73 
This  solution  is  simple  and  attractive  but  is  largely  unsatisfactory.74  Second,  there  is  a  direct 

















Review:  Martin  Loughlin  and  Neil  Walker,  eds.,  The  Paradox  of  Constitutionalism:  Constituent  Power  and 
Constitutional Form, Oxford University Press, 2007, 375pp, 6 INT.L J. CONST. L. 358, 358 (2008). 






74  Kelsen’s  solution,  is  still  a  coherent  one;  it  is  however  a  solution  as much  as  burying  head  in  the  sand when 
something  unpleasant  is  occurring  may  constitute  a  solution  for  an  ostrich.  In  somehow,  Kelsen  resolves  the 
problem by negating it, by stating that it is not a legal issue, and that it is outside a juridical field. As noted by his 




76  In a sense, we resolve  the problem of  the authorship of  the constitution by making  reference  to an  imagined 
pre‐political  person  (a  thicker,  historical  people,  this  time  ethnically  conceived)  that  creates  its  own  polity.  See 
Oklopcic, supra note 71, at 358. 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Constitutions,  accordingly,  are  legitimate  as  much  as  they  relate  to  the  nation  (whether 




problem  arises  here,  with  regards  to  the  identity  of  that  people  that  constitutes  the 
constitution.  One way  out  is  to  explain  it  by making  reference  to  theories  from  outside  the 
juridical field, such as those of ‘social contracts’ and the ‘state of nature’.81  
                                                
77  As  outlined  in  different  parts  of  this  paper,  there  are  different  concepts  of  nation  and  people.  For  Sieyès, 
however, they are synonymous. See Yack, supra note 43, at 533. The distinction between a ‘nation’ and a ‘people’ 
gives place  to  two different doctrines,  largely  influential  in  contemporary  states, between  ‘national  sovereignty’ 
and  ‘popular  sovereignty’.  Both  doctrines  are  elaborated  by  Carré  de Malberg  ‐who maintains  that  they  were 





within  a  given  territory)  who  can  exercise  sovereignty,  directly  or  indirectly  (through  representatives),  national 
sovereignty refers to an abstract entity, the nation, which is composed, not only of individuals living at a given time 





80 The problem here  is  that one may go further  in challenging the criteria through which one can determine the 
identity  of  that  “people”,  and  how  it  acquires  its  distinctive  character  as  a  single  entity.  Some  constitutional 
theorists  have  embraced  a  circular  answer  to  this  question:  “Duncan  Ivison,  for  example,  has  argued  that  the 
“[c]onstitution  constitutes  the  People  who  in  turn  constitute  it.”  In  a  similar  vein,  in  the  context  of  European 





an  imagined  one,  provide  an  interesting  account  that  merits  further  consideration.  As  rightly  pointed  out  by 
Nathan Brown,  constitutionalism and constitution‐writing have been dominated by metaphors of  collective  self‐
definition: “a constitution is an attempt by a political community to express the fundamental rules and values of 
political  life.”  Brown,  supra note  21,  at  47.  However,  there  are  different  approaches  to  social  contract.  Venter 
distinguishes at  least three: 1) The British approach – which did not need a written constitution‐ emphasizes the 
political  self‐government  of  society  through  parliament.  2)  The  French  approach  –  which  had  few  scruples  in 
replacing  its  constitutions  ‐ emphasizes  the nation as  it  is manifested  in  the  state. The American  social  contract 
approach  reflects  the  American  concern  with  a  society  consisting  of  a  multitude  of  individuals  whose  mutual 
contract  is  contained  in  the  Supreme  Constitution.”F.  Venter,  Constitution  Making  and  the  Legitimacy  of  the 





Without  underestimating  the  relevance  of  questioning  the  identity  of  the  people,  by  looking 
backward in remote origins, we should rather ask ourselves a completely different question:82 
What should we do with those who do not share the same cultural heritage of the nation? Can 
the  state  use  those  differences  to  justify  discrimination  against  them?  Such  attitude  is 
dangerous especially in contemporary states which are characterized by being multiple in terms 
‘nations’,  cultures,  languages and ethnicities,  that  live within  the same borders, as citizens of 
the same state.83  
The remaining problem is to understand if, and within which limits, the will of the nation shall 
be  applied  by  the  state  and  reflected  in  the  constitution.  Is  it  sufficient  that  a  nation wants 
something for this will to be considered good? The problem of those who accept this option is 
that the guiding political will  lose all rationality.84 The paradox of constitutionalism is that the 
                                                
82  There  are  different  possible  answers  in  contemporary  constitutional  and  political  theory  to  the  question  of 
constituent  power,  at  least  four,  as  summarized  by  Loughlin  and Walker:  “(i)  the  juridical  containment  thesis, 
whereby constituent power is exhausted by and absorbed within the settled constitutional form, as, for example, 
in much contemporary  liberal  theory based on  contractarian assumptions  (e.g. Rawls);  (ii)  the  co‐originality  and 
mutual articulation thesis, whereby the legally constituted power of the polity operates in productive tension with 
a continuing background commitment to popular sovereignty (e.g. Habermas); (iii) the radical potentional thesis, 
whereby  constituent  power  is  neither  colonized  by  nor  in  symbiosis  with  the  legal,  but  remains  a  latent 
revolutionary possibility which lies behind and shadows the legally constituted authority of the polity (e.g. Negri); 
and  (iv)  the  irresolution  thesis,  which  rejects  the  first  two  forms  of  accommodation,  but  also  dismisses  the 
possibility  of  isolating  the  radical  potential  of  constituent  from  the  constituted  forms  of  sovereign  power,  and 








cohesion  of  the  state.  In  other  words,  the  importance  of  the  constitution  lies  not  in  its  expression  of  pre‐
established political identity, but in its ability to transform it into a civic one. According to Preuss: “The constituent 
power  is  simultaneously  the  creator of  the  constitution and  the permanent  threat  to  it.  Yet,  both  functions are 
necessary for the vitality of the constitution.” Preuss, supra note 46, at 164. Accordingly, “[w]hat matters is not the 
pre‐constitutional shared –or unshared–  identity, but the new political  identity based on the constitution  itself.” 
Lerner, supra note 73,  at 26. As pointed out by Preuss,  “[t]he  constitution,  although created by  the  constituent 
power,  must  always  fight  against  the  tendency  of  its  own  creator  to  infuse  pre‐political  elements  into  the 
structures of politics.” Preuss, supra note 46, at 148. In a sense, “[t]he constitution gives birth to the people in the 
sense in which this notion has been developed for the concept of democracy that is in the sense of the demos.” U. 
K. PREUSS, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION: THE  LINK  BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONALISM AND PROGRESS 19  (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 
Humanities Press 1995); quoted in: Lerner, supra note 73, at 26.  
84 I refer to rationality in general terms, but I have in mind Max Weber’s distinction between ‘formally’ rational and 
irrational,  and  ‘substantively’  rational  and  irrational.  Although  originally  formulated  to  describe  the  economic 
actions (where formal rationality refers to  ‘abstract calculability’ while  ‘substantive rationality’ refers to ultimate 
values  and  needs), Weber’s  insight may  be  of  help  for  legal  thought.  S. M.  Feldman, An  Interpretation  of Max 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legitimacy of  the  constitution  is no more dependent on national preferences.  It  gives human 






It  is most challenging to understand the meaning of  the reference to Shari‘a  in constitutional 
texts. In fact, many Arab countries stated in their constitutional texts that Islam is the religion of 
state,86 and that Shari‘a, ‘principles of Shari‘a’,87 or Islamic Jurisprudence,88 is a or the source of 
                                                                                                                                                       
Weber's  Theory of  Law: Metaphysics,  Economics,  and  the  Iron Cage of Constitutional  Law  16  LAW & SOC.  INQUIRY 
205,  205‐48  (1991).  With  this  distinction  in  mind,  my  statement  will  be  reformulated  as  follows:  ‘lose  formal 
rationality’ because it will decreases predictability and increases dependency on ultimate values and needs of the 
concerned community. This means also that, the opposite process is also unfortunate, because it means that law 
becomes  increasingly  formally  rational,  without  consideration  of  ultimate  values  and  needs  of  the  concerned 
community.  For Weber,  this  is  dialectic  between  form  (thus  process)  and  substance  is  characteristic  of modern 
societies.  It  is, accordingly,  inevitable and  inescapable, an  ‘iron cage’. See  ib. at 229.  If my understanding  to  the 
contribution of Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt  to constitutional  theory  is correct,  then  for  the  former,  the  formal 
rationality prevailed, while the latter, insisted on substantial rationality. Weber, on the contrary does not seem to 
be  interested  in making  a  choice.  For  him,  it  seems,  the  issue  is  not  ‘process’ or  ‘substance;  rather,  it  is  about 
recognizing the existence and the relevance of both. 
85  In  the words of Rosenfeld  (commenting on Preuss contribution  to  the volume he edited):  “The Constitutional 




deployment  of  institutional  devices  designed  to  control  the  influence  of  prepolitical  forces  on  the  shaping  of 














Presidency,90  or  even  the  King,91  to  be  held  by Muslims.92  Some  constitutions  excluded  this 
reference to  Islam from possible  future amendments,93 or refer to  Islamic Shari‘a again when 
constitutional provision of equality of women is made.94  






not  accept  intra‐Muslim  borders.  Most  importantly,  the  Islamic  umma  is  not  defined 
                                                
89 Examples of reference to Shari‘a as a source of  legislation are: Article 2 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of 
Bahrain; Article 2 of the Constitution of Kuwait; Article 7 of the Constitution of United Arab Emirates (1971); Article 




to the Shari‘a? Egyptian Judges and the Refernce to  Islam,  in THE SHARI‘A  IN THE CONSTITUTIONS OF AFGHANISTAN,  IRAN 
AND EGYPT  ‐  IMPLICATIONS  FOR PRIVATE  LAW 161, 163  (N. Yassari ed.,  Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2005). This article was 
amended  in 1980 by a popular  referendum A. O.  Sherif, Constitutions of Arab Countries and  the Position of  the 
Shari‘a, in THE SHARI‘A IN THE CONSTITUTIONS OF AFGHANISTAN, IRAN AND EGYPT ‐ IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVATE LAW 155, 158 (N. 
Yassari  ed.,  Tübingen,  Mohr  Siebeck  2005).  Interestingly,  Article  3  states  that  “sovereignty  is  for  the  people” 
remained as it is. 
90  See,  e.g.,  Article  73  of  the  Constitution  of  Algeria;  Article  3  of  the  Constitution  of  Syria;  Article  38  of  the 
Constitution of Tunisia.  
91 See, e.g., Article 28 (e) of the Constitution of Jordan provides: “No person shall ascend the Throne unless he is a 




excluded de  facto  from holding  those positions,  in different ways. First,  in hereditary Kingdoms or Emirates,  the 
position of head of state is not open for others from outside the reigning families, which are all Muslim. Second, in 
the Arab republics, where elections are held, the religion of the majority  is  Islam. This makes  it difficult  (but not 
















authority  except  in  subordination  and  in  accordance  to  the  Law  revealed  by  God  and  his 
prophet.98  But,  if  God  is  a  source  of  authority,  how  come  then we use  positive  law  to  grant 
certain principles, which authority is based on divine origin, the power of law?  
If  the  reference  to  Islam  and  Shari‘a  does  not  create per  se  an  Islamic  state, why  then Arab 
states  refer  to  Shari‘a  in  their  constitutions?  (Notice  that my  concern  here  goes  beyond  the 
explanation of why certain provisions have been  included and why certain  formulations were 
preferred  instead of others. Rather, the question I raise  is related to the reasons behind such 
reference  itself.) When  redacting  their  constitutions, why  the overwhelming majority of Arab 
states seem to prefer granting such primordial place to Shari‘a in their constitutions?  
One of the possible ways to explain this phenomenon is cultural and religious particularities of 
each  nation  that  justifies  and  explains  such  reference.99  In  fact,  some  provisions  present  in 
                                                
96 As Hasan al‐Banna, the spiritual father of the Muslim Brothers, puts it: “Islam does not recognize geographical 
frontiers and does not  take  into account  racial differences. On  the contrary,  it  considers all  the Muslims as one 
umma and regards all Muslim countries as one watan, regardless of the distance and boundaries which separate 
them.”  Bensaid,  supra  note  60,  at  171.  According  to  Sayyed Qutb,  “the  fatherland  of  a Muslim  ceased  to  be  a 
portion of land. Instead, his watan became the home of Islam, the land in which Islam and Islamic law are the sole 
authority.”  He  then  concludes:  “Muslim’s  watan  is  not  a  piece  of  land,  and  his  nationality  is  not  that  of  a 
government.” Quoted in: Id. at 172‐3 (emphasis omitted).  
97  Olivier  Roy  distinguishes  between  Islamic  movements,  increasingly  nationalized,  and  radicalism,  which  is  by 
definition de‐territorialized: "C’est par l’inscription de leur action politique dans le cadre territorial de l’État‐nation 
que les mouvements islamistes sont devenus nationalistes, ou du moins se sont nationalisés, à l’encontre de leur 
idéologie  d’origine,  qui  se  voulait  internationaliste.  En  ce  sens  les  grands  mouvements  islamistes  ont  été  des 
facteurs  de  renforcement de  l’État‐nation et  se  retrouvent  aujourd’hui  proches des nationalistes  laïcs  dans  leur 
opposition  aux  États‐Unis.  À  l’inverse,  le  radicalisme  violent  est  le  propre  de  mouvements  dé‐territorialisés, 
comme al Qaïda." O. Roy, Islamisme et nationalisme 104 POUVOIRS 45, 53 (2003) (emphasis omitted).  











constitutional  texts  support  such  a  vision  of  Islam  as  ‘cultural  heritage’,100  or  as  ‘moral 
values’.101  In  this  sense,  they  may  be  even  shared  by  non‐Muslim  citizens,  because  being 
‘Islamic’ is no more something religious, but moral, ethical and cultural.102 If this interpretation 
is  correct,  then  the  different  ways  constitutional  texts  refer  to  Islam  and  Shari‘a  is  not  an 
issue,103 or at  least,  it  is not the main  issue, since the supremacy of  the constitution, and the 




                                                                                                                                                       
1956 to distance itself from the British. Islam was declared the religion of the state[.]” Sherif, supra note 89, at 157 
(emphasis added). The  same author makes a  connection between  the British  involvement  in  the drafting of  the 
constitutions of  Jordan and  Iraq, under mandate,  and  the absence of  a  reference  to  “God” or  “God’s  laws”. He 





102 For some,  it  is possible even to conceive Shari‘a  itself as ethics rather than as  law;  in fact, human actions are 
assigned  one  of  the  five  “Shari‘a  values”  or  ahkam:  (required,  recommended,  indifferent,  disapproved,  and 
forbidden). Most interestingly, but also arguably, “postcolonial legal institutions have utterly changed the Muslim’s 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state, religion may not be totally absent from public affairs. Accordingly, the reference to Islam 




remit of positive  law, as expressed  in a  legislative  text  issued by state authorities.107  In other 
words, the binding character of the Shari‘a in the above sense is nothing other than the free will 
of human authority. The empowerment of Shari‘a, through the constitutional texts, means that 
a  ‘secular will’ not a  ‘divine will’  is at the origin of  its  legal character. Accordingly,  it  is on the 
light of “sovereignty  is for the people”, existent  in Constitutions of most Arab states, that the 
recognition of Islam as the religion of state and of Shari‘a as “source of legislation” needs to be 
interpreted.108  This  is  particularly  true  in  the  absence  of  a  religious  authority  competent  to 
                                                                                                                                                       
in  an‐Nabhani’s  opinion,  rests  on  the  following  bases:  1)  the  predominance  of  Islamic  law;  2)  the  government 
should be by  the people;  3)  people’s  obligation  to  instate one Caliph  for  all Muslims,  as  their  representative  in 
government; 4) people have the right to ijtihad and to propose legal rulings required to deal with the problems of 
everyday  life. According  to him,  the pillars  of  the  state  are  seven:  shura,  the head of  state,  the  executive body 
(assistants), the administrative apparatus, the rulers (wulat), the judiciary and the army. In his view, legislation is 
only the competence of the Caliph and of the people; and therefore, the Caliph has to consult the people (shura is 
an  obligation).  The  council  of  shura  –and  this  is  new‐  is  not  appointed,  but  elected  from  people  of  different 
regions.  An‐Nabhani  crystallised  his  position  by  proposing  a  constitution.  The  nation  for  him  constitutes  the 
practical means on earth of putting Islam into effect, by scrutinizing and judging the ruler. The ideas of an‐Nabhani 
affected Sayyid Qutb (1907‐1966) who was a member of the Egyptian Brotherhood, and began to concern himself 
with the question of social  justice  in  Islam. He distinguishes between pre‐Islamic (jahiliyya) and Islamic societies. 
The  first  can never pursue  solutions  to  their  social problems because  they are not  ruled by  Islam. Qutb  refused 








108  Deputy  Chief  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Constitutional  Court  of  Egypt,  Dr.  Omer  Adel  Sherif,  commented  on 
Egyptian  constitution’s  Article  2  (“…Islamic  Jurisprudence  [principles  of  Shari‘a]  is  the  source  of  legislation)  and 
Article 3 (“Sovereignty is for the people alone and they are the source of authority”) as follows: “While sovereignty 
remains with the people,  the recognition of  Islam as the religion of the state  implies that the sovereignty of the 
people is subject to the authority of God; that the authority of the people is a gift from God, and that they have 




“statement  [that  Islam  is  the  religion  of  the  state  and  that  Shari‘a  the  principle  source  of  legislation] must  be 





determine  what  is  and  what  is  not  part  of  Shari‘a,  rather  it  is  the  competence  of  the  state 
authorities  to  determine  that,  each  according  to  the  competences  determined  by  the 





                                                                                                                                                       
that  address  the meaning  of  Shari‘a  within  the  constitutional  framework:  “First,  it  is  acknowledged  that  Art.  2 
forms an integral organic unit with the rest of the constitution. No provision may overrule another; all provisions 
must  be  interpreted  in  accordance with  each other.  Secondly,  the  constitutional  obligation of  the  legislature  to 
adhere to the Shari‘a is prospective not retrospective in nature. The judiciary may invalidate post‐1981 laws that 
are inconsistent with Shari‘a, but it may not invalidate laws that predate the proclamation of Art. 2. And thirdly, in 
its  application  of  the  Shari‘a,  the  [Supreme  Constitutional  Court] must  always  distinguish  between  definite  and 
indefinite sources.” Sherif, supra note 89, at 158. The most important principle, and the most difficult to apply, is 
the third one. In fact, “few attempts have been made to analyse the content of this reference and its methods”, 
which make  the  situation  far  from being a  “clear‐cut”. See Dupret,  supra note 89,  at 161.  The question will  be, 
then, on who determine which principle of Shari‘a is definite and indefinite or what makes part of the principles of 
Shari‘a and what does not? For Sherif,  it  is  the Supreme Constitutional Court. See Sherif, supra note 89, at 158. 
Easy to say, but in practice, the way references to Islam in Egyptian legal practices are done is complex. See Dupret, 
supra note  89,  at  161.  It  is  true  that  “the  government must  ensure  that  the  dictates  of  God  triumph  over  the 
desires of man”. Sherif, supra note 89, at 159. Still, it is the task of the government to do so, under the scrutiny of 
the Supreme Constitutional Court. Summed up,  it doesn’t seem to me that Sherif  is telling a different story from 








110  In Egypt  for example, Dupret scrutinized the rulings of Egyptian  judges, and distinguished four categories:  (1) 
‘the objectivation’, (2) the ‘instrumentalisation’, (3) the ‘overvalidation’, (4) the ‘invalidation’. “The first is made up 
of  rulings defining  the  content of  Islam as a  recognized and eventually privileged  religion, or of  the Shari‘a as a 









freedoms  –  to  largely  non‐defined  ‘public  order’  or  other  conditions;  thus,  distinguishing  between  ‘freedom  of 
thought’ and ‘freedom of worship’. As it is the case in Egypt, in a case related to wearing veil in public schools, the 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to Shari‘a to justify their judgments, ending up by consecrating a single, unique public morality, 
one that does not contradict with Shari‘a  (or  the  judge’s understanding of what Shari‘a  is)112, 
even if in violation of individuals free choice and liberties (for both Muslims and non‐Muslims, 
altogether).113  
The  argument  of  ‘cultural  heritage’  and  the  argument  related  to  Islam  as  ‘religion  of  the 
majority’  is  an  attractive  explanation  for  the  reference  to  Islam  and  Shari‘a.  In  most  Arab 
constitutions, however, the people did not participate in the process of constitution‐making or 




paper.  I  suspect,  however,  that  the  insistence  of  the  conformity  of  the  state  with  Islam 
increases with the decrease of alternative legitimating narratives.117 Islam is only one narrative 
(within  many  others)  that  current  regimes  use  to  justify  their  authority.118  In  other  words, 
                                                                                                                                                       
“Court  underlined  that while  the  [freedom  of  thought]  cannot  be  restricted,  the  [freedom  of worship]  can  [be 
restricted] for the sake of higher interests, such as public order and morality.” Id. at 173. 




professor,  on  the  grounds  of  attacking  Islam  and  saying  heretical  things,  and  to  authorizing  for  sex  change 
operations. See id. at 172‐8. 
114 The ‘return to Shari‘a’ is being used rhetorically, even among Muslim intellectuals, focusing primarily on issues 













implementation of a constitution they do not believe  in. they will not call  for a balance of power  in government 
unless it  is according to terms they believe in.” Sherif, supra note 89, at 159. I read this statement as supporting 






or  communicate  with,  constituencies.  The  constitutions  of  Arab  states  refer  to  Islam  and 
Shari‘a, but  they  also  refer  to  equality,  rights  and  freedoms.  They  talk  about  citizenship  and 
democracy,  limited  government  and  accountability.119  Those  constitutional  provisions  are 
directed  towards  different  constituencies.  They  serve  different  purposes.  Those  are  different 
pulses, going to different directions. However, they have one thing  in common; they all serve 
the  current  regimes  to  communicate  with  the  various  constituencies,  whether  in  the  local, 
regional or international.  
One thing is certain, however. In contemporary Arab states, the relation between religion and 
state  is becoming increasingly problematic.120  In fact, the advantage of Shari‘a  is that you can 
invoke  it  to  support  anything  you  want.  The  disadvantage  is  that  everybody  understands 
that.121 Reference to Islam or to Shari‘a is often used, not to support current regimes, but to call 
for rebellion against them.122 For many Islamist groups, the current Arab states are not Islamic 
at all  or,  at  least, not enough  (seeing  the  current map of Arab and Muslim  states, which are 
territorially  defined,  it  is  maybe  more  correct  to  say  that,  for  some  fundamentalist  groups, 
                                                
119 It is also largely related to the syncretism in constitution making in the new era. In such constitutions, it is very 
possible to find two extremely contradicting provisions in the same constitutional text. Syncretism in a sense does 
not  encourage  reaching  compromises  (intended  as  half way  between  two  extremes, where  everybody  gives  up 











make  a  parallel  critique  to  possible  reference  to  Shari‘a  in  modern  Arab  states,  conceived  as  a  standard  that 
determines  the  binding  character  of  (state‐positive)  law  (thus,  Shari‘a  in  a  sense  play  the  role  of  that  standard 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those Arab states can never be Islamic enough).123 For many Islamist groups, the undemocratic 









pointed out by Bensaid: “It  is amazing to note that the  Islamist attitude towards the European political model  is 
more open and positive than the pan‐Arab attitude. The latter rejects the Occident and refuses to import foreign 
political notions that do not reflect the genuine authenticity which the Arab nation seeks to recover. Contrary to 
this  introverted  attitude,  the  Islamist  attitude  is marked  by  openness  and  even willingness  to  borrow  from  the 
Occident.”  See Bensaid,  supra  note  60,  at  169‐170. Hassan  al‐Banna  showed  an  interest  to  the  principles  that 
direct  a  constitutional  government  since  they  correspond  with  Islam:  “When  one  considers  the  principles  that 
guide the constitutional system of government, one finds that such principles aim to preserve in all  its forms the 
freedom of the individual citizen, to make rulers accountable for their actions to the people, and, finally, to delimit 
the  prerogatives  of  every  single  authoritative  body.  It  will  be  clear  to  everyone  that  such  basic  principles 





RES.  J.  INT.L  L.  13,  44  (2006).  This  may  lead  some  to  conclude  that  there  is  incompatibility  between  Islam  and 
democracy. The issue of compatibility or incompatibility goes beyond our main concerns in this paper. One thing is 
sure,  however,  as  pointed  out  by  Mallat:  “This  should  leave  us  with  the  acknowledgement  that  the  zero‐sum 
debate on incompatibility or compatibility between Islam and democracy often interchangeable with "the West"‐
will  remain  active  and  unanswered  for  some  time,  until  at  least  some  of  the  political  dust  settles  and  a  stable 
political and economic course is reached in one or more Middle Eastern countries.” Chibli, supra, at 45.  
125 Many  suspect  that  the  ‘resurgence’  of  ‘political’  Islam  is  the most  salient  features  of  contemporary Middle 
Eastern politics. However, this political Islam is not necessarily a replacement for secular nationalism, rather it is an 
integral component of personal and collective identity that has been ignored, suppressed and crudely manipulated 
by  the  state.  D.  F.  Eickelmm,  Changing  perceptions  of  state  authority:  Morocco,  Egypt  and  Oman,  in  THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE ARAB STATE 177, 200 (Gh Salamé ed., London, Croom Helm Ltd 1987).  
126 See Bensaid, supra note 60, at 168.  














Others  take  a  different  path,  trying  to  show  how  the  system  of  government  which  was 
established since early  Islam  is, by definition,  ‘constitutional’ or  ‘constitutionalist’,  in  that  the 
normative content of Shari‘a played the limitative role towards the governmental power. This is 
why it is possible even to talk about “Islamic Constitutionalism”.133 For Sherif, “[t]he adherence 
to  Islamic  law  is  important  to  our  ability  to  limit  the  powers  of  the  government. No man or 
governing  body  should  retain  absolute  power.  A  strong  constitution  based  on  Islamic  norms 
ensures  that  they will  not.”134  For  both,  Islamic  constitutionalism  has  something  in  common 
with  ‘constitutionalism’  in  the way applied and  interpreted  in western democracies: a  limited 
government.  
                                                







OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 85 (2009);  Intisar A. Rabb, "We The Jurists":  Islamic Constitutionalism  in  Iraq, 10 U. PA.  J. 
CONST. L. 527 (2008);  
Nathan  Brown,  Islamic  Constitutionalism  in  Theory  and  Practice,  in  DEMOCRACY,  THE  RULE  OF  LAW  AND  ISLAM  491 
(Eugene Cortan & Adel Omar Sherif eds., Kluwer Law  International 1999); Nadirsyah Hosen,  In Search of  Islamic 
Constitutionalism, 21 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC SOCIAL SCIENCES 1 (2004);  
Donna E. Arzt, The Application of International Human Rights Law in Islamic States, 12 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 202 
(1990); Mark Gould,  Islam,  the  Law,  and  The  Sovereignty  of God, 149  POLICY  REVIEW  3  (2008);  Azizah  Y.  al‐Hibri, 
Islamic Constitutionalism and the Concept of Democracy, 24 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1 (1992); 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According  to  this  interpretation,  constitutionalism as  such does not  contradict with Arab and 
Islamic legal culture and their philosophical foundations.138 It is not constitutionalism as limited 
government  that  is  problematic;  on  the  contrary;  limiting  the  government  by  making  a 
reference to a superior normative order that goes beyond the state is completely coherent with 
Arab  and  Islamic  culture.  Instead,  it  is  often  the  case  that  the  obstacles  towards  limited 





It  includes  also  two  other  elements:  the  adherence  to  the  rule  of  law  and  the  protection  of 
human rights. The problem with such two elements, as part of that normative order limiting the 
government,  is  that  they may  (and  effectively  they  often  do)  compete with  other  normative 
orders  in  Arab  states.  A  clash  may  occur  when  certain  rights  are  violated,  based  on  that 
normative (largely religious, but also historically and culturally contingent) framework, referred 
to with  the  very  generic  term of  Shari‘a.  Two examples,  often  cited,  are of  real  concerns  for 
individuals  living  in many Arab and  Islamic  countries:  religious minorities  and women.140  In  a 
                                                
135 See Bahlul, supra note 133, at 515. 
136  This  is  also  the  case  in  Japan  for  example, where  the  concept  of  constitutionalism  is  unknown.  See Hasebe, 
supra note 77, at 240. 
137 See Bahlul, supra note 133, at 515.  
138  In  an  earlier  study,  I  showed  how  Arabic  and  Islamic  philosophies  (such  as  those  that  can  be  traced  in  Ibn 
Khaldun and Al‐Farabi) may subscribe easily to what is now called constitutionalism. see Khalil, supra note 27, at 
148‐57;  Asem  Khalil,  The  Enactment  of  Constituent  Power  in  the  Arab World,  ANCILLA  IURIS  (ANCHI.CH)  88,  95‐97 
(2006). 
139  As  pointed  out  by  Rosenfeld,  “[t]here  appears  to  be  no  accepted  definition  of  constitutionalism  but,  in  the 
broadest  terms, modern constitutionalism  requires  imposing  limits on  the powers of  government,  adherence  to 
the rule of law, and the protection of fundamental rights.” Rosenfeld, supra note 20, at 3. 
140  This  explains  why many  Arab  states  expressed  their  reserves  on many  international  conventions  related  to 




sense,  “equality  is  inextricably  linked  to modern constitutionalism”,141  that  it  is  impossible  to 
perceive  (modern)  constitutionalism  without  it.142  It  is  by  this  equality  component,  that 
constitutionalism  becomes,  not  a  limitation  to  democracy,  but  rather,  its  enhancement, 
accomplishment and realization.  
For minorities and women’s rights, the reference is often made to human rights, as defined by 
international  law.  They  are  perceived  to  be  universal,  not  dependent  on  (cultural,  social, 
historical  or  religious)  contingencies  of  each  state,  taken  individually.  But,  what  if  certain 
interpretations  of  Shari‘a  are  used  to  discriminate  against  religious  minorities,  or  against 
women? What if Shari‘a is defined and interpreted in a way to be fundamentally contradicting 
with  religious  freedom  and  women’s  rights?  Without  arguing  that  Shari‘a  is  effectively 
contradicting religious minorities’ and women’s rights,143 the issue is: ‘what if’? What would be 
                                                                                                                                                       
reference to shari‘a. See e.g. reservations expressed by many Arab countries who have ratified Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979): Egypt expressed reservations on articles 2 and 
16  of  the  Convention  on  the  Elimination  of  All  Forms  of  Discrimination  against  Women  (1979).  On  the  same 
convention,  Saudi Arabia expressed  similar  reservation, but  in  general  terms:  “In  case of  contradiction between 
any  term of  the  Convention  and  the  norms  of  islamic  law,  the  Kingdom  is  not  under  obligation  to  observe  the 
contradictory terms of the Convention.” Similar general reservation is also done by Morocco and Oman. There are 
however  some  signals  of  change  of  attitudes.  In  2008  and  in  2009  for  example  Egypt  and  Algeria  notified 
respectively  the  Secretary‐General  that  they  had  decided  to  withdraw  the  reservation  in  respect  to  Art.  9(2), 
related to granting to women of equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of their children. For more 
about  the  status  of  ratification  and  the  reservations  expressed  by  member  states,  see: 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV‐8&chapter=4&lang=en#2  
141 Rosenfeld, supra note 20, at 8.  











(while  the  limits  reside  in Shari‘a)  is  ‘constitutionalism’  for  sure, but  it  is  certain  that  it  is not  ‘constitutionalism’ 
that we mean in this paper, and that constitute a challenge for contemporary states.  
143 This  is not my concern here; however, many scholars asserted that  it was historically so, and  is actually so  in 
some contemporary Arab states. See, e.g., A. Emon, The Limits of Constitutionalism in the Muslim World: History 
and  Identity  in  Islamic  Law,  in  Constitutional Design  for Divided Societies:  Integration or Accomodation? 258  (S. 
Choudhry ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press 2008).  




The  discussion  here  may  lead  us  to  another;  a  discussion,  becoming  almost  classical,  in 







disadvantage  is  that  the  content  of  agreement  is  disagreement  itself,  rendering 
constitutionalism  in  reality void of  its  content and sense; a  content  that  justified  the  interest 










to  understand  modern  constitutionalism,  in  which  human  rights  and  equality  is  an 
indispensable pillars, there is a need to discuss the issue from the perspective of the theory of 





145  See,  e.g.,  Emon,  supra  note  143,  in  which  the  cases  of  Egypt  and  Saudi  Arabia  are  considered,  regarding 
religious freedom.  
146  See,  e.g., M.  Rosenfeld, Can Human Rights  Bridge  the Gap  between Universalism and  Cultural  Relativism? A 
Pluralist Assessment Based on the Rights of Minorities, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 249 (1999); E. Reichert, Human 
Rights:  An  Examination  of  Universalism  and  Cultural  Relativism,  22  JOURNAL  OF  COMPARATIVE  SOCIAL  WELFARE  23 






state,  not  from  the  perspective  of  cultural  or  religious  particularity  of  each  nation.  Such  a 
theory needs to be read on the light of the new realities in which contemporary states are in.  





law  and  domestic  laws,  largely  codified  in  a  constitution  and  constitutional  mechanisms  to 
ensure that the sovereign himself act legally, while the state is no more the only and absolute 
authority to determinate what is legal and what is illegal.148  
In  such  a  context,  states  and  international  organizations  become  central  actors  in  the 
constitution‐making  for  new  states.  This  phenomenon  ‐that  some  have  referred  to  as  the 
“internationalization  of  the  constituent  power”,149  while  means  that  the  supreme  and 
sovereign act of constitution‐making (constituent power) is not exclusively a domestic issue.150 
The examples of what  is  called sometimes  ‘the  internationalization of  the constituent power’ 
                                                




of  governance  beyond  the  territorially  defined  state.”A.  Hamann  and  H.  R.  Fabri,  Transnational  networks  and 
constitutionalism, 6 INT.L J. CONST. L. 481, 481 (2008).  
148 Considering this “New Global Legal Order”, Baker argues: “The twentieth century has seen a fundamental shift 
in  the  ways  in  which  constitutions  are  understood.  By  the  middle  of  the  twentieth  century,  a  new  sort  of 
constitutionalism  emerged,  rejecting  the  idea  of  the  legitimacy  of  every  form  of  political  self‐constitution.  The 
central  assumptions  of  this  new  constitutionalism  were  grounded  in  the  belief  that  not  all  constitutions  were 
legitimate, and that legitimate constitutions shared a number of universal common characteristics. These common 
characteristics were both procedural  (against arbitrary use of  state power) and substantive  (limiting  the  sorts of 
policy  choices  states  could  make  in  constituting  its  government  and  exercising  governance  power).  These 
procedural  and  substantive  norms were,  in  turn,  an  articulation  of  a  “higher  law”  of  the  community  of  nations, 
reflecting a global communal consensus evidenced in common practice or international agreements.” Backer, supra 
note 133, at 85 (emphasis in origin).  
149  See  Khalil,  supra  note  27;  NICOLAS  MAZIAU,  LES  CONSTITUTIONS  INTERNATIONALISEES:  ASPECTS  THEORIQUES  ET  ESSAI  DE 




States  under  its  Constitution,  has  imposed  such  a  precondition  on  national  governance.  It  is  also  becoming  a 
requirement of  international  law,  applicable  to  all  and  implemented  through  global  standards, with  the help of 
regional  and  international  organizations.”  Th.  Franck,  The  Emerging  Right  to  Democratic  Governance,  86  THE 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 46, 47 (1992). 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are  multiple.151  In  the  Arab  world,  this  was  the  case  in  Iraq,152  and  largely  the  case  of  the 
Palestinian Authority after Oslo, in its effort to write a Basic Law and a Draft Constitution for the 
State.153  
Many  explanations  are  given  for  this  phenomenon:  the  evolution  of  international  law  and 
international  society  and  the  relations  between  states  altered  the  notion of  sovereignty;  the 
weakness of states in the third world and the multiplication of crisis situations and the will of 
developed countries to act against these crises had led to the changing of the raison d’être of 
peace‐  keeping  and  peace‐making  operations.154  Most  importantly,  it  is  related  to  the 
increasing number of states and the fact that the formation of most of them followed a conflict 
situation. In such a context, the constitution is often connected to a peace treaty between new 
neighbors,  through  which  one  can  formalize  a  modus  vivendi  of  various  ethnic,  national, 
religious, linguistic groups that are ‘condemned’ to live in the same state. 
In  those  cases,  the  involvement  of  international  organizations  and  foreign  countries  in  the 
constitution‐making  process  of  new  born  states  is  clear.155  Despite  the  fact  that  popular 
                                                
151 It may be partial as a result of a treaty or an act of international law (Palestine, 1947, Namibia, 1990, Cambodia, 
1991, Timor Leste, 2001, Macedonia, 2001), or as a result of de facto situation (post‐Second‐World‐War Germany, 






different  processes  that  have  been  taken  place:  drafting  a  Basic  Law  for  the  Palestinian  Authority,  and  the 
Constitution for the State of Palestine. For more about constitution making in the Palestinian case, see Khalil, supra 
note 27; A. Al‐Qasem, Commentary on Draft Basic  Law  for  the Palestinian National Authority  in  the Transitional 
Period,  7  Palestine  Yearbook  of  International  Law  187,  (1992/1994);  A.  Al‐Qasem,  The  Draft  Basic  Law  for  the 
Palestinian National Authority, in THE ARAB‐ISRAELI ACCORDS: LEGAL PERSPECTIVE (E. Cotran and M. Chibli eds., London‐
The Hague‐Boston, 1997); N. H. Aruri and J. J. Caroll, A New Palestinian Charter, 23 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES 5 
(1994);  Z.  Hassan,  The  Palestinian  Constitution  and  the  Geneva  Accord:  The  Prospects  for  Palestinian 
Constitutionalism  16  FLA.  J.  INT'L  L.  897  (2004);  F. Milhem, The  Constitutional  System of  the  Palestinian National 






155  This  involvement  of  international  community  in  constitution  making  goes  beyond  the  simple  transplant, 
borrowing,  or  imposition  of  legal  texts.  Such  experience  is much  older  than  the  Second World War,  and  is  not 
limited to constitutional texts. This  involvement reflects the tendency to prioritize one form of government over 




involvement,  if any,  is often marginalized  to  the moment of adoption or endorsement of  the 
constitution  in toto, with the political and economic system it represents, constitution‐makers 
often maintain  the  reference  to  the  ‘We  the People’. This  is a  ‘legal  fiction’; a necessary one 
though; for it is necessary to close the circle in the democratic account of constitution and law‐
making  in a particular polity.156 The problem is  that  it no more a self‐constitution,  in  the way 
the  American  and  French  revolutions may  be  suggesting.  Instead,  it  is  the  constitution  of  a 
pseudo‐self, completely detached from the collective which gave rise to this process, in the first 




human  being,  without  discrimination  based  on  sex,  nationality,  religion,  or  ethnicity.  This 
common human belonging is present in all mankind inevitably pushes towards rejection of the 
particular and  the support of  the universal.  It means also  that  it pushes  towards one specific 
form of government. Plurality is perceived as dangerous because it enhances differences rather 
than  common  elements;  different  values  rather  than  shared  ones,  different  solutions  rather 
than  common  ones.  We  live  in  a  globalized  world;157  thus,  we  live  in  the  era  of  globalized 




state‐centered, making  it  different  although  still  the  same.  In  such  a  context,  constitutional  forms  acquire  new 
meaning, in which both constituent and constituted powers are limited by something else that goes beyond them, 
exists  before  them,  and  may  take  a  form  outside  both  of  them.  It  is  that  human  being,  its  security,  stability, 
development and prosperity  that acquires  the place originally  reserved  for  the sovereign.  In  such a context,  the 
state is no more perceived as the absolute authority but rather serves the objective the welfare of human beings. 
156 This legal fiction is necessary to resolve the question of the legitimacy of those constitutions. The international 
constituency  continues  to  refer  to  the  people  and  the  nation  in  the  text  that  is  drafted  and  proposed  for 
consideration and adoption. According to M‐F. Labouz : “La fiction juridique par le mode de raisonnement dérivé 
sur lequel elle s’appuie (…) remplit une fonction de légitimation idéologique (…) et traduit (…) le jeu des rapports 
de  puissance  au  sein  de  la  Société  internationale  (…)  on  objectera  peut‐être  que  seules  les  grandes  puissances 
peuvent user du procédé fictif avec quelque chance de succès et modeler ainsi la règle de droit à leur convenance 
en  la  dotant  d’une  nouvelle  positivité.”  M‐F.  LABOUZ,  L’ONU  ET  LA  COREE :  RECHERCHES  SUR  LA  FICTION  EN  DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL  PUBLIC 21, 314  (Paris, PUF 1980). Quoted  in: MAZIAU, supra note 149, at 7. According  to Chemillier‐
Gendreau :  « La  fiction  est  une  technique  (…)  remplissant  une  certaine  fonction  dans  le  rapport  de  forces :  elle 
peut  le  consolider  ou  le  renverser. » M.  Chemillier‐Gendreau, Origine  et  rôle  de  la  fiction  en  droit  international 
public,  in ARCHIVES  DE  PHILOSOPHIE  DU  DROIT,  LE  DROIT  INTERNATIONAL  160  (Tome  32,  Sirey,  1987).  Quoted  in: MAZIAU, 
supra note 149, at 7. 
157 For more about the impact of what has been called “World Society” on nation‐states, see: J. Meyer and others, 
World  Society  and  the  Nation  State,  in  THE  GLOBALIZATION  READER  84  (F.  J.  Lechner  and  J.  Boli  eds.,  Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd, 2004). 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constitutions.158  In  such  a  context,  similarities  between  constitutions,  mainly  the  written 
constitutions, are striking. This similarity is however misleading, and largely related to the way 
new constitutions are drafted.159 
The process described above as  something  that occurred  following  the  Second World War  is 
not without negative aspects. This  international  interference in domestic affairs of states may 
end up suffocating local aspirations. The way constitutions are drafted and imposed sometimes 




                                                
158  It  is  in a  sense a  contradiction, why despite  the globalization, differences, often of great measures,  still  exist 
between various political  systems and constitutional  texts.  It  is  also  surprising how  this  globalization movement 
often carries with  it a movement that  I may call  ‘return to the origins’,  insistence on cultural particularities, and 
national  exceptionalism.  Those  tendencies  are  maybe  a  reaction  to  ‘mondialization’,  ‘universalization’  and 
‘internationalization’, that can be summarized under ‘globalization’. This contradiction, I believe, is only apparent, 
because  globalization  does  not mean  complete  hegemony.  In  a  different  context,  Go  outlined  that,  “while  the 
norms  or  hegemonic  assumptions  of  world  society  contributed  to  the  fact  that  postcolonies  adopted  written 
constitutions,  particularities  in  any  given  constitution  were  shaped  by  subglobal  (and  yet  not  quite  national) 
registers:  imperial,  religious and  ideological. The  independence constitutions therefore reveal that  if  there was a 
world society that determined constitutional construction, it was a society fractured internally by multiple scales of 
influence.  Constitutional  models  flowed  intra‐imperially  and,  in  the  case  of  religion  and  Communism, 
transnationally. No single constitutional model had reached the point of global dominance.” Go, supra note 14, at 
97.  
159  Scholars,  interested  in  the  constitutions  adopted  during  the  ‘new  era  of  constitutionalism’  notice  this 
phenomenon of convergence and divergence that exist. They explain this by the way new constitutions are made; 
they called  it with  specific names:  ‘syncretism’  (See Go, supra note 14, at 104  ),  ‘bricolage,’  (see Tushnet, supra 
note  66,  at  1285‐6),  ‘gardening’  (e.g.  R.  R.  Ludwikowski,  "Mixed”  Constitutions  –  Product  of  an  East‐Central 
European Constitutional Melting Pot 16 B. U. Int’l L. J. 1, 64 (1998)), ‘plagiarism’ (See LANE, supra note 20, at 196), 
or ‘distortion’ (See Osiatynski, supra note 25, at 267). 
160  Rich  countries  for  example  may  use  subordinate  their  foreign  and  cooperation  policy  by  the  adherence  of 
newborn  states  and  weak  states  to  such  a  model.  The  risk  here  is  to  suffocate  the  local  population,  their 
particularities and their culture. This may have a boomerang effect, with negative consequences on the efficiency 
of the constitutional text, since the constitution may be considered as an ‘outside product’. 





a  constitution,  causing  a  setback  regarding  internal  sovereignty  of  the  state.  Pierre‐Caps  noticed  that:  « C’est 
précisément (la) création radicale de la constitution, en vertu d’une décision du pouvoir constituant de la nation, 










The  constitutions  of many Arab  states  are  evolving;  their  political  and  legal  systems  are  in  a 




largely  defined  by  state  positive  law.  Arab  states  are  also  increasingly  interested  in  written 
constitutions,  because  they  provide  a  valid  legitimating  tool;  most  importantly,  they  are 
increasingly attracted towards constitutionalism.  
Regardless of whether human rights, rule of law, and democracy are compatible with Shari‘a as 
such,  or  whether  the  argument  of  cultural  and  religious  particularity  is  simply  presented  by 
existing  regimes  to  justify  the  lack  of  democracy  and  the  deficiency  in  their  human  rights 
protection record, the issue at stake is to determine what is ‘universal’ or universally valid, and 
what can be  ‘culturally contingent’.  In my account, which  is  largely historical and descriptive‐
analytical,  I perceive  the development  towards more protection of human rights  (largely as a 
reaction to the atrocities of states  in Second World War)  in both states’  legal systems, and  in 
international law, as favoring the thesis of universality. The way this protection is done, and on 
which normative basis,  is  irrelevant as  such.  It  can be  international  law or constitutional  law, 
but it can also be a religious normative order.  
However,  in  case  of  contradiction  between  those  normative  orders  (international  and 
constitutional law on the one side, and religious law on the other), and seen the impossibility of 
determining in a definitive way, what makes part of that religious normative order, it is for state 
authorities  (again,  secular  not  religious  authorities)  to make  a  choice.  In  fact, when  an  Arab 
state  opts  for  the  religious  normative  order,  it  does  not  make  reference  to  a  unique  and 
commonly shared normative order, but rather it is the state itself that defines and shapes that 
normative order. In this sense I discussed Shari‘a largely ‘confined to the remit of positive law’. 
The  issue,  in my  account,  is  not whether  or  not  Arab  states  should  conform  to  Shari‘a,  as  a 
normative order, but whether or not the state, as sovereigns, can be re‐introduced within the 
                                                                                                                                                       
cette intrusion normative dans le pouvoir constituant laisse entrevoir la possibilité d’une constitution détachée de 
son  substrat  national,  désincarnée,  ‘dénationalisée’  en  un  mot,  pur  engrenage  de  normes  hiérarchisées… ».  S. 
Pierre‐Caps, Le constitutionnalisme et la nation, in LE NOUVEAU CONSTITUTIONNALISME, MELANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE GERARD 
CONAC 72 (Economica, 2001). Quoted in: MAZIAU, supra note 149, at 6. 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legitimacy,  and  their  legitimacy  is  dependent  on  the  success  of  this  evolution  towards 
constitutionalism. It may be true that only a few Arab states can be considered as  indigenous 
creations; most of them indeed did not develop as an indigenous and genuine product and their 
borders may  have  been  created  artificially.  Accordingly,  they may  have  dubious  origins,  but 
they can have a certain future; their identity will depend largely, not on what they were, but on 
what  they  want  to  be.  In  such  an  identity,  no  one  is  excluded  a  priori,  but  no  one  has  the 
monopoly over the identity itself. A political system that incorporates such a vision is open to all 
individuals (regardless of their sex, religion, or ethnicity) and to all parties, whether nationalist, 




If  the  rejection  of  constitutionalism,  as  limited  government,  is  the  result  of  the  reticence  of 
existing  regimes,  unwilling  to  realize  a  transition  to  democracy,  resistance  to  modern 
constitutionalism, as a normative order in which human rights are an integral part, goes beyond 
the totalitarian regimes. It is indeed often the case that national, religious, historical or cultural 
particularities  are  used  as  narratives  to  discredit  modern  constitutionalism;  the  latter  being 




perplexing  is  the  fact  that  most  Arab  constitutions  refer  to  Shari‘a  and  Islam  in  their 
constitution, thus giving it a kind of supremacy, entrenched by the same canonical constitution. 
Isn’t  it  then  that  constitutionalism,  which  entails  the  subordination  of  the  government  to  a 
superior normative order, largely entrenched in a written constitution that will  lead inevitably 
to  the  rejection of any competing normative orders?  Isn’t  it  in  the name of constitutionalism 
that  modern  constitutionalism  can  be  rejected?  In  other  words,  modern  constitutionalism 
appears  to be contradicting and competing with other available normative orders, within  the 
same legal system.  






normative  orders,  that  compete  within  the  same  legal  system.  On  the  contrary,  there  are 
serious grounds to believe that it is often the case, not only in Islamic and Arab countries, but 
also  in  Asian  countries,  as much  as  in Western  countries. What  this  paper  challenged  is  the 
rejection  of  modern  constitutionalism  based  on  the  historical,  religious  and  cultural 
particularities  of  each  state.  It  is  true  that most  prevalent  concepts  and principles  related  to 
modern  states,  territorially  defined,  are  largely  formulated  in  the West,  based  on  particular 
historical experiences. It is also true however that similar path can be traced in other contexts, 







superior  normative  order,  in  which  human  rights  is  an  essential  part?  How  can  we  still  talk 
about  sovereign  states, when  those  sovereigns are  introduced  to  the domain of  legality,  and 
when, at the same time, they do not monopolize the task of defining of what is legal and what 
is illegal? Isn’t it the end of national states? Isn’t it a contradiction with states’ sovereignty and 
superiority?  Isn’t  it  a  new  kind  of  hegemony  (colonialism,  imperialism  or  whatever  other 
expression  that  can  be  found  in  the  literature…)  towards weak  state  exercised,  exercised  by 
strong states? 
Switching  the  discussion  from  cultural  and  religious  exceptionalism  to  an  issue  of  state 
sovereignty  has  the  advantage  of  relocating  the  discussion  within  the  theory  of  state. Most 
importantly, it has the advantage of avoiding a fallacy that resisting modern constitutionalism, 
as normative order  limiting sovereign states,  is an exclusive concern of Arab or Islamic states. 
Skepticism  towards modern  constitutionalism  is  indeed present  elsewhere.  Regardless  of  the 
                                                
162 This  is not  to argue, however,  that Arab states’ continuous research  for constitutional  legitimacy can only be 
realized  through  a  return  to  the  past  (whether  to  ethnic  or  religious  identities,  that  go  beyond  all  and  each 
concerned  Arab  states),  but  rather  in  their  capacity  to  project  a  better  future,  arguing  that  legal/philosophical 
revolutions,  irrespective of  the place of  their  formulation, are universally accepted and applied  in contemporary 
states,  including  Arab  and  Muslim  states.  We  can  distinguish  between  Islamic  and  Muslim  state,  used  often 
throughout this paper. The distinction only dates to the late twentieth century, in the context of what is called ‘the 
Islamic  resurgence’.  Since  then,  some  made  a  distinction  between  Muslim  used  as  an  adjective  and  Islamic. 
However,  “[t]he  term Muslim  is  increasingly  identified with  the existing  community  and  the practices of people 
self‐identified as Muslim. The  term “Islamic” has  sometimes been  reserved  for  those  instances where  there  is a 
conscious effort to reflect the fundamental principles and ideals of Islam interpreted in a relatively restrictive way. 
In  this  usage,  for  example,  a  “Muslim  state”  is  a  state where  the majority  of  the  people  are Muslim, while  an 
“Islamic state” would be one in which there is a formal program of implementation of the regulations and ideals of 
Islam. “Islam” remains the identification of the religion underlying both usages.” Voll, supra note 116, at 360. 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varieties  of  reasons  behind  such  resistance  or  rejection  of  modern  constitutionalism,  the 
argument this paper advance is that the concerns behind it, from the perspective of the theory 
of  state,  are  largely  the  same.  The  reticence  of  contemporary  states  to  modern 
constitutionalism  is accompanied by  fierce attack by many scholars;  such attack explains  to a 
large extent why  there  is no doctrinal  agreement about what  constitutionalism  is  at  the  first 
place.  In  my  account,  this  skepticism  towards,  resistance  and  rejection  of  modern 
constitutionalism,  is  not  explicable  by  reference  to  religious  or  cultural  particularities,  but 
rather by the fact that we are looking at new realities with old lenses.163  
Modern  constitutionalism  is  indeed  crystallized  as  a  result  of  the  development  of  both 
international  law  and  national  legal  systems,  towards more  protection  of  human  rights.  It  is 
true that the centrality of human rights may have traces that can be found as late as the end of 
the  19th  century,  where  international  law  developed  towards  imposing  more  limitations  on 
states  in  times of armed conflicts. Such evolution had had a considerable success and known 
large  diffusion  following  the  dissolution  of  the  USSR.  In  my  narration,  however,  modern 
constitutionalism, in which the protection of human rights is an essential component, is not the 
product of  the  late 19th  century,  or  the post‐Soviet Union,  it  is  rather  the  result  of  the post‐
Second World War.  States  that  witnessed  the  atrocities  of  gross  violations  of  human  rights 
during  the  Second World War  seem  to  be  saying,  through modern  constitutionalism:  ‘never 
again’. Modern  constitutionalism  is  nothing  else  but  that  normative order  that makes  ‘never 




                                                
163  I  borrowed  this  metaphor  from  Schauer,  interested  in  discussing  what  other  scholars  refer  to  as  ‘imposed 
constitutionalism’, “In this paper I seek to explain this phenomenon, a phenomenon that will, en passant, illustrate 
why  seeing  constitutions  as  necessarily  either  indigenous  or  imposed  is  invariably  to  see  today’s  constitutions 
through  yesterday’s  lenses.”  Frederick  Schauer, On Migration  of  Constitutional  Ideas,  37  CONN.  L.  REV. 907,  907 
(2005). 
